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COMMENTS AND DIGESTS
BY STATE OF GASOLINE USED IN INAVIATION-COMMERCE-TAXATION
TERSTATE COMMERCE.-Plaintiffs operate an air transport business from points

within the State of Oklahoma to points outside of that State, and at the
same time operate an intrastate transport business wholly within the State
of Oklahoma, it being admitted that the two lines are so interdependent and

intermingled that the interstate lines could not be maintained efficiently
without the intrastate line. Plaintiffs bring this action to restrain the defendant, as State Auditor, from collecting the state excise tax of four cents
per gallon on all gasoline consumed within the State, it being contended
by plaintiffs that the statute imposing the tax is unconstitutional as being an
invasion of the exclusive right of control over interstate commerce vested
in Congress. Held: granting a permanent injunction, that the statute is
unconstitutional and void as applied to air transport companies engaged in
interstate commerce, and that the intrastate line is so mingled with, and
interdependent on, the interstate lines that the gasoline used in the intrastate business likewise is not subject to the tax.

United States Airways v.

Shaw, State Auditor, 43 Fed. (2d) 148 (Okla., Aug 13, 1930).
All of the Congressional power to regulate interstate commerce is given
to it by U. S. Const., Art. I, § 8(3), wherein it is 'said: "Congress shall
have power
States . .

. . . to regulate commerce . . . among the several
." Van Winkle v. State, 27 Del. 578, 91 Atl. 385 (1914).

Generally, it is beyond the power of the States to burdefi, prohibit or interfere with interstate commerce: Rosenberger v. Pacific Express Co., 241
U. S. 48, 36 Sup. Ct. 510, 60 L. Ed. 880 (1915); or rights flowing directly
therefrom. Circular Advertising Co. v. American Mercantile Co., 66 Fla.
96, 63 So. 3 (1913). The interference must be direct and substantial and
not merely incidental. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U. S. 610, 35 Sup. Ct. 140,
59 L. Ed. 358 (1914) ; Austin v. Tennessee, 179 U. S. 343, 21 Sup. Ct. 132,
45 L. Ed. 224 (1900). It is generally held that taxation of interstate commerce is a burden and not a mere regulation, regardless of the purpose.
Kansas City, Fort Scott & Memphis Ry. v. Kansas, 240 U. S. 227, 36 Sup.
Ct. 261, 60 L. Ed. 617 (1916). It may well be contended, therefore, that
the tax in the instant case was a direct and substantial burden on interstate commerce and not to be justified when imposed by a State. This contention is sustained by the leading case of Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U. S. 196, 5 Sup. Ct. 826, 29 L. Ed. 158 (1884), wherein it was
held that a State could not impose an excise tax on the privilege of carrying on interstate commerce within its limits, the tax being in effect a direct
tax on the commerce involved. It is maintained that the court in the
instant case was correct in holding the tax to be an excise tax, although
levied on all gasoline "consumed," as when a tax is laid on certain goods
as marked out by their use the tax is in effect on that use, the intent to
tax that use only being indicated by the levying of the tax only on that
part of the particular goods engaged in that use. This excise tax must
be distinguished from a property tax, it being admitted that a State may
tax property having a situs within its limits. Baltic Mining Co. v. Massachusetts, 231 U. S. 68, 34 Sup. Ct. 15, 58 L. Ed. 127 (1913) : Western Union
Telegraph Co. v. Attorney General, 125 U. S. 530, 8 Sup. Ct. 961, 31 L. Ed.
790 (1888). In the case of Helson v. Kentucky, 279 U. S. 245, 49 Sup. Ct.
279, 73 L. Ed. 683 (1929), where a State placed a tax on all gasoline used
or consumed within the State, it was held that the tax, when applied to
gasoline used by a ferry company in running boats from one State to

another was invalid as a violation of the exclusive power of Congress over
interstate commerce. This case, it is submitted, is directly in point with the
instant case and was properly taken as controlling by the instant court.
This case has also apparently been the authority for the holding in the
[600]
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more recent case of Western Air Express, Inc. v. Welling, Secretary of
State [1931], 231 C. C. H. 2005 (Utah, 1930), wherein the Utah Court
enjoined the collection of a state gasoline tax on gasoline used by the
plaintiff company in interstate commerce. Many other States have statutes
similar to that in the instant case, and these statutes may be divided into
four classes. (1) Those that are a direct tax on the gasoline as property,
when located within the State. It is submitted that in such cases the statutes
will be held valid under the general principle that a State may tax property
having a situs within the State although such property is engaged in interstate commerce; (2) those imposing a tax, as in the instant case, on the
consumption and use of gasoline. It is contended that in this class of cases
the statute will be held invalid as being an excise tax on interstate commerce. The United States district court for New Mexico in the case of
Mid-Continent Air Express Corp. v. Lujan, Comptroller, 47 Fed. (2d) 266
(D. C. N. M. 1931), on facts similar to those of the instant case, held such
a tax to be an unlawful interference with interstate commerce. The same
result has been predicted under similar statutes in Opinion of Attorney
General of Michigan to Secretary of State [1931], 231 C. C. H. 1501 § 3002
(Oct. 17, 1930), and in Opinion of Attorney General of Illinois [1931],
231 C. C. H. 2002 §5004 (Dec. 8, 1930), wherein it is also said that under
such a statute the provision for collecting the tax and refunding it to companies engaged in interstate commerce does not amount to an interference
with interstate commerce, but is a reasonable method for the prevention
of fraud. An interesting statute of this nature is that recently adopted
by the State of Arkansas: Senate bill No. 88, § 6 [1931], 231 C. C. H. 2010,

2011-2012 (1931)
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220, 222-223, § 5020; wherein

provision is made for the refunding of the tax to certain exempt air transport classes, among which is "any established interstate airline operating
on a regular time schedule." The use of the word "established" in this
statute would seem to be open to objection. (a) It may mean "lines now
operating," as distinguished from those entering the field in the futurean interpretation which is clearly open both to practical objections, since
it fails completely to cover the field, and to constitutional difficulties under
the equal protection clause. (b) The word may be used as an unnecessary
synonym of "operating on a regular schedule." But, it is submitted, it is
doubtful if any discrimination between airlines "operating on a regular time
schedule" and lines not so operating can be maintained. Query: Suppose
the airline makes only occasional interstate flights on a temporary schedule?
Can the tax apply to the gasoline used therein? It is submitted that constitutionally it cannot, but under the statute the airline clearly would be
liable for the tax. (3) Those wherein the tax is imposed on the sale of the
gasoline. It is contended here that the statute will be held valid, as a sales
tax is to be considered as a tax on the dealer and not on the consumer.
Orange County Oil Co. v. Amos, State Comptroller, 130 So. 707 (1930);
See: (1930) 4 So. Cal. L. Rev. 417. That this will be the holding in such
cases is expressed in Opinion of Attorney General of Florida [1931], 231
C. C. H. 2002, § 5005 (Nov. 25, 1930, Nov. 26, 1930).
(4) Those wherein
the statute imposes a tax on the storage of gasoline in the State. A conflict is to be expected in this class of cases. In Opinion of Attorney General
of Florida [19311, 231 C. C. H. 2014, § 5023 (Dec. 19, 1930), it is said
that the Florida storage tax would not apply to gasoline brought into the
State and stored there for use in interstate commerce; while in Opinion of
Attorney General of Alabama [1931], 231 C. C. H. 2003, § 5006 (1930), in
discussing a similar tax statute, it is said that the fact that the gasoline is
sold to air transport companies is immaterial since the interstate character
of the gasoline has been lost by the storage within the State. It is contended that this is the logical view, as, having lost its character as interstate
commerce, any tax laid on it may be justified, either as a property tax or as
an excise-storage tax. The upholding of such a statute, however, must be
based on a clear finding that the gasoline has lost its character as interstate
commerce by the storage within the state limits, the tax then being similar
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in nature to a sales tax, imposed on the one storing it, and having no relation
to the intended use. For a further discussion of the principles involved
herein see, William K. Tell, Taxation of Aircraft Motor Fuel, (1931) 2
JOUR. OF AIR LAW, 342.
CARLOS R. MANGHAM.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE AIR TRAFFIC REGULATIONS-CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AS APPLIED TO FLIGHTS WHOLLY INTRASTATE.-A New York statute

[N. Y. Gen. Bus. Law (Cahill's Consol. Laws 1930, c. 21), § 245(7)J
establishes a local height of flight rule for that State. Defendant was
charged with a violation of this rule during an intrastate flight. He demurred to the information, on the ground that the statute was unconstitutional as an interference with the Congressional power over interstate commerce. Held, that since (1) statutes must be construed so as to sustain
their constitutionality if possible; (2) defendant was not engaged in any
type of "commerce"; (3) defendant's flight was wholly intrastate; and
(4) there is nothing to show that the rule laid down by this statute constitutes a burden upon, or an interference with, interstate commerce, the
demurrer must be overruled and the constitutionality of the statute upheld.
People v. Katz, 249 N. Y. S. 720 (Spec. Sess. Queens Co., March 31, 1931_.
The principles involved in the instant case will be discussed in detail
in a subsequent issue of the JOURNAL.
R. K.
INSURANCE-INCONTESTABLE

CLAUSE-DEATH WHILE ENGAGED IN

AERIAL

NAvIGATION.-Defendant issued its policy, agreeing to pay to plaintiff-beneficiary, on the death of her husband, the insured, $2,000. The policy contained clauses providing for forfeiture in case of non-payment of premiums
and limiting the company's liability to the return of premiums paid in case:
(1) the insured, within five years from the date of the policy, should engage
in any military or naval service in time of war and should die in the service
within six months thereafter or during the war; (2) the insured should
commit suicide within one year from the date of the policy; and (3) "In
the event of the death of the insured arising, in whole or in part, directly
or indirectly, from engaging in aerial navigation, except while riding as a
fare paying passenger in a licensed commercial aircraft provided by an
incorporated common carrier for passenger service, and while such aircraft
is operated by a licensed transport pilot and is flying in a regular civil airway between definitely established airports." The policy contained, also, an
"incontestible clause" reading: ". . . such contract shall be incontestable
after it shall have been in force, during the lifetime if the -insured, for one
year from the date of the policy, except for non-payment of premium or
for violation of the conditions of the policy relating to military or naval
service in time of war." The insured met his death while engaged in aerial
na.vigation under circumstances not within the saving exception of the
clause in the policy, but after the policy had been in force for more than
one year. Held, that plaintiff may recover the face value of the policy,
because: ". . . the effect of the incontestable clause is to select from
the original conditions of the policy only two qualifications affecting the
principal obligation of the defendant . . .
these two exceptions being
non-payment of premiums and violation of the military and naval service
clause. In other words, before the lapse of one year all the conditions and
qualifications mentioned in the policy affect the agreement of the company,
but after the policy has been in force for one year only two of these conditions have any force, and the condition relative to aerial navigation is not
found among these two." Leidenger v. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. of
Cal., 135 So. 85 (La. Ct. of App. June 8, 1931).
It is well settled in most jurisdictions that "The incontestable clause
bars every defense not excepted expressly therein saving want of insurable
interest . . . But the insurer is not precluded from showing that a loss
suffered was due to an excepted risk, not covered by the policy." Vance
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on Insurance, 2nd ed., 818. The real problem in the instant case was, thus,
whether the aerial navigation clause was a condition, made incontestable by
the lapse of one year, or was an exception from the risks covered by the
policy. The result reached seems proper, not only in view of the limited
construction placed on incontestable clauses by the Louisiana courts (especially -in Brady v. Fidelity Mutual Life Ass'n., 13 Orl. App. 35, cited and
relied on by the court in the instant case), but also in view of the peculiar
wording of the incontestable clause itself, which, by making express reference
to the analagous military and naval service clause, would seem, under the
expressio unis doctrine, intentionally to have excluded the aerial navigation
clause from its operation.

In an earlier case arising in New York, where a more liberal interpretation of the incontestable clause is adopted, it was held that a rider reading: "Death as a result of service, travel or flight in any species of aircraft, except as a fare-paying passenger, is a risk not assumed under this
policy; . . ."was not in conflict with, nor affected by an incontestable
clause reading in the same manner as the one in the instant case. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Beha, 226 App. Div. 408, 235 N. Y. S. 501 [19291,
U. S. Av. Rep. 92 (1929), (discussed in (1930) 1 Air L. Rev. 150) aff'd,
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 252 N. Y. 449, 169 N. E. 642 [1930],
U. S. Av. Rep. 114 (1930). This case the court in the instant case expressy
refuses to follow.
R. K.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-AIRPORTS-PILOTs-FLYING INSTRUCTOR AS A
OR "WORKSHOP" WITHIN THE MEANING
THE AcT.-Petitioner was employed by the defendant airport operator

PERSON EMPLOYED IN A "FACTORY"

OF
as an instructor, with incidental duties as commercial pilot and as assistant
to the mechanic in a repair shop maintained by the airport for purpose of
servicing and repairing planes. He was injured while on a flight with a
pupil (the Commission finding, against the contention of the employer,
that he was engaged in instruction at the time of the accident and had
not, as claimed, deviated from this purpose to pursue another objective).
The Oklahoma Workmen's Compensation Act (Okla. Comp. Stats. 1921, §
7283, as amended by Okla. Laws 1923, e. 61, § 1) sets forth a list of occupations to which the Act applies, this list being exclusive. Among the occupations set forth are: "Factories, cotton gins, mills and workshops where
machinery is used . ..
These terms are defined by the Act (Okla.
Comp. Stats. 1921, § 7284 as amended by Okla, Laws 1923, c. 61, § 2).
Held, that, under the statutory definitions, the airport was a "factory" and
petitioner, even when engaged in flying, was employed in a "workship where

machinery is used."

Fort Smith Aircraft Co. v. State Industrial Commis-

sion, 1 Pac. (2d) 682 (Okla. July 7, 1931).
A discussion of the problems raised by this case will be presented in a

subsequent issue of the

JOURNAL.

R. K.

